The Folded Bustani Story
The following series of document extracts run to many
more pages than what you see here at first.
For the benefit of people without the well-developed skill of
skim-reading, I have folded down sections you
do not need to see to understand the story and read it properly.
The folded text is usually hidden
by the symbol
UNFOLDED... which you can
click on with your mouse to unfold and read.
It's always coloured purple. Click on it again to fold it back.
This is the story about the sacking of the Director-General
of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in 2002 as
witnessed in the annals of the Parliamentary Official Record.
This career diplomat in the UN, who was in charge of the Chemical Weapons Convention,
got in the way of a higher goal than the abolition of
chemical weapons, and was eliminated from his post.
The power to remove the then Director-General, Mr. José Bustani,
from his job was acted upon by the UK government in collaboration with others on the 22 April 2002 during a private meeting.
There remained the problem of explaining this action to the public.
The real reason -- whatever it was -- couldn't be exposed.
Instead, an inconsistent official reason was concocted to cover it up.
It was tested the following day during a
Select Committee investigation.
23 April 2002
Hansard source reference
Evidence to the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs
Andrew Mackinlay
256.
I wonder if I could use this occasion to
ask you, Minister, but I imagine it is Mr Ehrman who might answer
this one on José Bustani, who is the Director General of
the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The
Americans have used their clout and have mustered a large number
of votes, and I understand the United Kingdom support this action,
to sack him.... Could you take this opportunity of telling Parliament
why the United Kingdom Government supports the sacking of
gentleman[José Bustani]?
(Mr Bradshaw) The United Kingdom Government voted
along with all the other EU members.
257. I vote along with Labour MPs every night
but I have to explain why—occasionally. Do you know, on
occasions
, just to complete the story, sometimes... it is extraordinarily
difficult to explain why. Why have we supported the sacking of
this man?
(Mr Bradshaw) Because we share the belief
of all the
other European Union members who voted the same way and the vast
majority of members of the committee who also voted the same way...
that there were serious management problems and that Mr Bustani
was not the best candidate to sort those out.
258. What were these management problems?
(Mr Bradshaw) I would rather not go into the details
because I am not sure whether I am covered by parliamentary privilege.
259. You are.
(Mr Bradshaw) Suffice to say that the management of
Mr Bustani left something to be desired, the consequence of which
was he had lost the confidence of the vast majority of the members.
What we are concerned about is that this body is an effective
body. We had the view which was shared, as I said, by the vast
majority, I think only one per cent of the members voted against
this[2].
260. The State Department said "Mr Bustani
had a habit of refusing to consult, such as when he proposed anti-terrorism
measures after 11 September attacks without first consulting the
United States". If we thought there were management problems,
did we complain about his stewardship?
(Mr Bradshaw) Yes, we have made our position quite
clear about what we thought of his stewardship.
261. But you have not made it clear, have you?
I do not wish to be facetious, you have just told me there were
problems but you have not made it clear what they were. I think
Parliament has a right to be told. It might sound old-fashioned.
What were the reasons?
(Mr Bradshaw) I have already indicated that we were
unhappy with his management. I am slightly nervous about going
into detail in case he might take me to court. I will take the
advice of the Chairman as to whether he would accept a letter
written in confidence from me giving more detail about the exact
reasons why we were unhappy with his management style.
...
Sir Patrick Cormack
262. You are covered by parliamentary privilege.
Tell us all about it.
(Mr Bradshaw) I think, Chairman, if you do not mind,
I would rather leave it that we shared the concerns of the vast
majority of the other members, including the whole of the rest
of the European Union who voted with us on this, that he had lost
the confidence of the body because of management deficiencies.
I really do not want to say any more than that....
Andrew Mackinlay: So you will do us a letter,
will you?
Chairman
263. Certainly you would be covered by parliamentary
privilege if you were now to respond, otherwise if you wish to
make it in confidence the Committee will be ready to receive it.
(Mr Bradshaw) I will be very happy to do that.
Andrew Mackinlay: For the record, I am afraid
we might return to it, might we not, Chairman? Forget about the
substance for the moment, it is a parliamentary principle that
we should have the right to ask.
Chairman
264. A letter to us I am sure would contain
many things which are not defamatory or which cannot be used.
(Mr Bradshaw) I am happy to write along those lines,
Chairman[3].
Chairman: If you could aim to write an open
letter to the Committee.
Sir Patrick Cormack
[...]
265. I do not want to prolong this thing but
the fact of the matter is here[Here] is a very high ranking official
who has been dismissed and my colleague is asking the perfectly
reasonable question why he has been dismissed.
Whilst I understand
that you are put on the spot, Mr Bradshaw, and I have some sympathy
with you, I hope that your letter can be fairly frank and I hope
you will accept that the Committee may well then wish to talk
to you again in public about the letter. We do have a right to
know whether this chap has merely disobliged the Americans or
if he has had his hands in the till or has done something pretty
terrible....
(Mr Bradshaw) I have already made it clear, Chairman,
that these were not concerns that were shared just by the Americans,
they were shared by many other countries. The vast majority of
countries at last night's vote voted for Mr Bustani's removal.
I would suggest that it is simply implausible that any one country
can nobble so many other countries at once and persuade them to
do something which is totally—
Chairman
266. You will write to us[4].
(Mr Bradshaw) I will write to you on
the detail. To be perfectly honest, I am not aware of all the
details of exactly what he is supposed to have done wrong.
267. It is not the view of the Committee that
you should be bounced at this time but what the Committee would
expect is an open letter from you setting out heads of objection
to his continuation.
(Mr Bradshaw) I am happy to write to you in confidence
along those lines but what I do not want to do is to drag someone's
reputation out in public in this way.
Chairman: I am sure there is much that can be
said in open that the Committee can use. If there are one or two
confidential matters of the sort touched on by Sir Patrick, let
those be—
Andrew Mackinlay: Chairman, I want to make myself
clear. You were not here on Sierra Leone. When we started to ask
difficult questions and scratched the surface people did not want
to respond. I do not want to labour this point this afternoon
but I think the Minister or the Director for International Security
could and should answer this. I guess I have not got the majority
of the Committee with me this afternoon pressing for this—that
is a question, not a statement—but I think if the Minister
writes we make it clear that we reserve the right to come back.
Chairman: Of course.
Andrew Mackinlay: I do not think necessarily
that letter—I am reluctant to commit myself that that letter
somehow locks me into not pursuing it further.
Chairman: I do not think any letter is going
to lock you into that.
Mr Chidgey: I accept everything the Minister
says on this but there is a point of precedent being raised where
difficult questions are posed. Surely this Committee would not
wish Ministers to respond by a letter that is in confidence, because
that is not the purpose of this Committee.
Andrew Mackinlay: I have got a suggestion for
the Committee.
Mr Olner: I have to say, Chairman, I thought
we were taking evidence.
Andrew Mackinlay: Chairman, let the Minister
consult on this and my questions stand on the table and he can
come back either physically or in an open letter. If he does not
then I think it is a matter for us to discuss in business because
I want answers to that.
Chairman
268. Minister, it would be wrong to expect from
you now an immediate reply. What we are entitled to is a full
reply in open. If there are matters which are extremely sensitive
in a personal way then by all means add part of a letter which
cannot be published, but the presumption must be that the letter
should be open and in the public domain[5].
(Mr Bradshaw) I am perfectly happy to
do that, Chairman. Your Members might feel slightly less frustrated
if I added that I think the main areas of our concern were financial
management and staff morale.
[...]
After refusing to give a straight answer during his testimony,
Mr. Bradshaw sent his written letter laying out the official case
for the dismissal of Mr. Bustani. It added nothing whatsoever to his evidence.
To summarize: the case against the Director-General was that there were
financial difficulties in his organization, and that
other nations had voted against him for unexplained reasons.
24 April 2003
Hansard source reference
evidence
Memorandum from the Parliamentary Under
Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
* * * * *
As I said at yesterday's evidence session, we
have been concerned about the OPCW
's recent record of financial
and administrative management. In particular, in 2001 the Executive
Council was belatedly informed that the Organisation was... facing
a financial crisis, caused primarily by a failure to match spending
to a realistic assessment of actual income.
The drastic measures
proposed to cope with the deficit centred on severe cutbacks in
the OPCW's verification work—which lies at the core of its
activity in support of implementation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. These cutbacks have resulted in a fall in programmed
inspection activities of almost 50 per cent. Together with our
EU partners, we made representations to Mr Bustani on several
occasions last year to express our concern about this decline,
but without success. The Director General cannot escape responsibility
for allowing this financial crisis to develop....
* * * * *
Other Member States have raised other issues.
But the key point I would like to underline is that it[It] became
clear early this year that the Director-General had lost the confidence
not just of the US but also of the majority of the OPCW's other
leading contributors. At a meeting of the OPCW's Executive Council
in March, 17 members supported a motion of no confidence in Mr
Bustami's leadership
only five voted against.... We had hoped that
the Director-General would understand that message and step down
in the interests of the OPCW as a whole.... However, he chose not
to do so, preferring that the issue should be tested by a Special
Conference of States Parties to the CWC.
That Conference has just
met.... In a vote on 22 April, 48 states expressed no confidence
in Mr Bustani's leadership; only seven (Russia, Belarus, China,
Iran, Cuba, Brazil and Mexico) supported him. These figures speak
for themselves.
The Government's policy has been guided throughout
by our judgement of the best interests of the OPCW and the CWC.
It is clearly untenable if the Director-General has lost the confidence
of the countries collectively contributing over 75 per cent of
the Organisation's funding. The priority now must be to draw a
line under this unfortunate passage and appoint a new Director-General
who can command the support of the entire membership. We can then
begin to address the urgent financial problems facing the OPCW.
...
Ben Bradshaw MP,
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
24 April 2002
If we look five years back into the record, one year after the formation
of the OPCW, there's a statement about the finances.
16 March 1998
Hansard source reference
writtenquestions
Chemical and Biological Weapons
Mr. Levitt:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs which countries are currently the subject of international inspections of their chemical and biological weapon capability.
Mr. Tony Lloyd:
One hundred and seven (107) countries are Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and hence subject to the inspections provided for under that Treaty. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention does not currently have an inspection regime; but the UK is pressing for the early conclusion of the negotiations on a Protocol which will fill this serious gap. Separate arrangements apply to Iraq, under the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.
Mr. Menzies Campbell:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what contribution in (a) cash terms and (b) as a percentage of the total the UK will make to the running costs of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons over the next five years. [33940]
Mr. Tony Lloyd:
The UK's assessed contribution for the 1998 budget (calendar) year is:
UK Dfl 6,755,779 5.32%
(Dfl 3.376 = £1 on 12/3/98)
The UK's percentage contribution will decrease slightly as more signatories accede to the Convention over the next few years, for which assessed contributions have yet to be determined.
Mr. Menzies Campbell:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment he has made of recent allegations by Ken Alibekov that Russia has continued to develop biological weapons in contravention of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention; and if he will make a statement. [33942]
Mr. Tony Lloyd:
In 1992, the Russian government admitted that the Soviet Union had conducted an offensive biological weapons programme, in violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and President Yeltsin issued a decree requiring that any non-compliant activity be terminated. Mr. Alibekov's allegations refer to the earlier programme. We continue to urge the Russian Federation to provide assurance of its full compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
Mr. Menzies Campbell:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment his Department has made of the (a) chemical and biological weapons research programmes being undertaken and (b) stocks of such weapons held by (i) Iran, (ii) Syria, (iii) Libya, (iv) China, (v) North Korea and (vi) Sudan; and if he will make a statement. [33944]
Mr. Tony Lloyd:
Assessments of this type are based on intelligence material on which it has been the practice of successive governments not to comment.
In the case of Iraq, the information we have supplied about chemical and biological weapons is based on material published by UNSCOM. Nothing comparable exists for these other countries.
Mr. Menzies Campbell:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what steps his Department is taking to encourage Egypt to sign and ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. [33946]
Mr. Tony Lloyd:
We are committed to making the Chemical Weapons Convention universal. We particularly regret that a number of countries in the Middle East--including Egypt--have not become parties to the Convention. We shall take every suitable opportunity to urge them to do so. As Presidency, we also plan to make EU demarches to that end.
[...]
Mr. Menzies Campbell:
To ask the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ... if he will list the countries in arrears in their payments to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; and what is the amount of arrears concerned.
Mr. Tony Lloyd:
Most of the 107 State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention are currently in arrears with their payments,
although the amounts involved are in many cases quite small in either percentage or absolute terms.... It may therefore be easier to name those countries which were fully paid up for the 1998 budget year
by the eighth session of the OPCW Executive Council from 27-30 January 1998...:
Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Slovak Republic, Sweden, United Kingdom.
At that point, some 85.3 per cent. of the 1997 budget contributions and 96.1 per cent. of the 1993-97 Preparatory Commission contributions had been paid. The total arrears until that point amounted to Df1 16.937,000.
(Df1 3.376 = £1 on 12/3/98)
Mr. Menzies Campbell:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what contribution (a) in cash terms and (b) as a percentage of the total (i) France, (ii) Germany, (iii) the USA and (iv) Japan will be making to the running costs of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons over the next five years. [33939]
Mr. Tony Lloyd:
The assessed contributions for these countries for the 1998 budget (calendar) year are:
| Country | Dfl | Percentage
|
|---|
| France | 8,152,650 | 6.5
|
| Germany | 11,505,141 | 9.06
|
| USA | 30,611,125 | 25.00
|
| Japan | 19,873,671 | 15.65
|
Note:
Dfl 3.376 = £1 on 12 March 1998
These percentage contributions will decrease slightly as more signatories accede to the Convention over the next few years, for which assessed contributions have yet to be determined.
Mr. Menzies Campbell:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what is the cost of disposing of Russian chemical weapons stocks; and how much of that cost in (a) cash terms and (b) as a percentage of the total will be covered by (i) the UK, (ii) France, (iii) Germany, (iv) the USA and (v) Japan. [33941]
Mr. Tony Lloyd:
The Chemical Weapons Convention makes clear that the responsibility for chemical weapons destruction rests with the possessor state. Without prejudice to this principle, the EU has pledged up to 15 million ECU of TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) funding for projects in chemical weapon destruction-related areas. A number of countries have also offered bilateral assistance, including the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden. We do not have precise or detailed figures for those countries' offers of assistance, but the total amount of foreign (non-Russian) assistance so far represents only a small proportion of the overall costs--estimated by Russia at more than US$4 billion.
Mr. Menzies Campbell:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what discussions he has had with the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; and if he will make a statement. [33943]
Mr. Tony Lloyd:
Neither my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary nor I have met the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Dr. Bustani. But we maintain regular contact with him and his staff through our Embassy in The Hague.
Mr. Menzies Campbell:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on negotiations on a compliance and verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention. [33945]
Mr. Tony Lloyd:
The most recent session of the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties, which is negotiating verification and compliance Protocol to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, took place in Geneva from 9-13 March. The UK is playing a leading role in these negotiations. At our initiative, the European Union agreed on 5 March a Common Position which makes clear our determination to promote decisive progress in the negotiations in the course of this year. We believe--not least in the light of the revelations of Iraq's extensive biological weapons programme--that strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention is both urgent and achievable.
[...]
It's a well-known practice in politics to
withhold funding for international organizations
in order to moderate their behaviour.
The following extract is background information supplied to
Parliament about the structure and activities of the
OCPW.
2 August 2000
Hansard source reference
evidence
APPENDIX 29
Memorandum submitted by Professor J P
Perry Robinson, University of Sussex
1. This Memorandum addresses the third item
of the terms of reference for the Committee's inquiry into Weapons
of Mass Destruction: the progress and effectiveness of the 1993
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1972 Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).
It is written from the standpoint
of an academic trained in chemistry and law and concerned about
militarisation of the life sciences, who since the 1960s has been
conducting research into public-policy aspects of chemical/biological-warfare
(CBW) armament and arms limitation....
2. Progress in relation to what, and effectiveness
on what yardstick? It was never the intention that these two treaties
should be stand-alone safeguards against CBW. Rather, their function
was to serve as consolidating influences within an array of other
anti-CBW measures. For the United Kingdom, once the Macmillan
government's secret decision to pursue chemical rearmament had
effectively been abandoned,[70]
the main element in this array has remained an alert and technologically
advanced protective posture against CBW weapons on the part of
the armed forces, with a watching brief for corresponding civil
defence. All such protection is expressly permitted by both treaties.
National intelligence machinery having at least some capacity
for monitoring foreign CBW capability is another element, as is
the national penal legislation that has conferred powers against
terrorists seeking access to CBW weapons. Special national export
controls have been added to the array as an anti-proliferation
measure, and in Brussels the United Kingdom took a leading role
in the formation of what in 1985 became the Australia Group, which
is an informal means for harmonising such controls among the main
exporting countries. Within all this, the primordial function
of the Conventions has been threefold: to assert a norm of abstention
from CBW armament; to reaffirm, as did the 1925 Geneva Protocol,
the ancient cross-cultural taboo against the use of poison and
disease as weapons; and to provide nuclei around which international
action against transgressors can crystallise. That threefold consolidating
influence in general, and the nucleating function in particular,
seem the proper yardsticks for the Committee's assessment of effectiveness.
3. The Conventions' provisions for compliance-vertification
and for what CWC Article XII calls measures to redress a
situation and ensure compliance, including sanctions are
the principal nuclei for promoting action by the international
community against transgressors of the norms against CBW armament
and its use for hostile purposes. In the application of these
provisions, the story thus far is not one of unmitigated success,
as the following episodes indicate:
(a) In 1981 the United States charged the
Soviet Union, Viet Nam and others with using toxin weapons (yellow
rain) in Afghanistan and southeast Asia. In so doing it
disregarded the Article V consultation procedure of the BWC and
the Article VI complaints procedure, preferring instead the route
of public diplomacy. The charges have not formally
been withdrawn, even though they have long since been discredited;[71]
(b) When, in October 1989, defector testimony
finally confirmed the existence and revealed the organisation
and scale of a clandestine bioweapons programme in the Soviet
Union, remedies were sought, not through the BWC itself, but within
the framework established by an ad hoc agreement among the three
co-depositaries of the treaty (the UK, the USA and the USSR);[72]
(c) Iraq was forced in 1991 to ratify its
May 1972 signature of the BWC as a condition of the Gulf-War ceasefire,
but when it became evident that its stocks of bioweapons had not
been destroyed within the subsequent nine months required by Article
II of the Convention, the matter was pursued within UNSCOM, not
BWC, machinery;
(d) Employment of chemical weapons by at
least four states parties has been alleged since the CWC entered
into force for them: India,[73]
Russia,[74]
Sudan[75]
and Turkey.[76]
Yet the allegations remain unresolved in the public record, notwithstanding
the verification capacity maintained by the treaty's international
oversight authority, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) headquartered in The Hague.
...
Nor, it should be said, is the story one of
unmitigated failure.... The OPCW is having remarkable success in
building confidence that chemical-weapons disarmament really is
beginning
, both among the main possessor states, and among those
others (for example, India) that have, in accordance with the
CWC, unexpectedly declared themselves to be possessors. A further
notable success came in 1997 with Cuba's invocation of BWC Article
V for consultations among BWC states parties on its allegation
that thrips infestations of certain of its crop cultivations had
been caused by a US act of biological warfare: formal cosultations
were duly convened, chaired by the UK, and, although they concluded
that it has not proved possible to reach a definitive conclusion,
Cuba nevertheless expressed itself satisfied. Even so, the four
illustrations at (a)-(d) above suggest that improvements are needed
in the compliance-verification and associated arrangements of
both treaties if they are to fulfil their response-nucleating
and therefore deterrent role....
4. As is well known, views on how much verification
is enough change in response to changes in the wider political
and security environment. Back in the early 1970s, there was no
consensus that the incorporation of an international verification
system into the BWC would provide cost-effective augmentation
of the overall array of countermeasures against bioweapons. So
the verification arrangements of the BWC were limited to the consultation
and complaints procedures of Articles V and VI. But in the mid-1980s,
when persuasive evidence of Soviet noncompliance was beginning
to accumulate, abrogation of the treaty came to seem an increasingly
attractive option for some, including officials of President Reagan's
administration in the United States. This development, and the
subsequent revelations about the Iraqi bioweapons programme, evidently
stimulated the BWC's friends into remedial action: into determining
whether new technology and new forms of relationship between government
and biology-based industry could yield compliance-verification
machinery suited to the new context. Here, the lead internationally
was taken by the UK government, which had at its disposal exceptionally
competent and dedicated personnel resources in the FCO Arms Control
and Disarmament Research Unit and the MoD Chemical and Biological
Defence Establishment. Meeting in special conference in September
1994, BWC states parties decided to open negotiations to strengthen
the Convention including possible verification measures.
For the past five years they have been working intermittently
on a draft BWC protocol, which, however, is still some good way
short of completion.
...
5. The CWC had been concluded in the meanwhile,
and had entered into force in 1997 with an elaborate verification
system.
This system is characterised by a division of labour between
the OPCW on the one hand and, on the other hand, the National
Authorities set up by states parties as required by CWC Article
VII.4 in order to fulfil their obligations under the treaty.[77]
...
The system is not yet fully operational in all of its aspects.
That, perhaps is why states parties have not yet put it fully
to the test. So stringent, however, is the confidentiality regime
within which the OPCW is obliged to operate that it is impossible
for the outside world to observe and assess the actual performance
of the CWC verification system. The outside world, including this
Committee, must rely solely on assurances given by OPCW Director-General
José Bustani. It is no aspersion at all upon him or his
staff to describe this situation as unsatisfactory.
6. With the BWC Protocol still unfinished,
and with the CWC verification system not yet fully operational,
an experience-based assessment of the role and effectiveness of
BWC/CWC compliance-verification within the overall array of anti-CBW
countermeasures is not yet possible. Only a negative conclusion
can be offered here; the episodes noted in paragraph 3 above point
to a BWC/CWC treaty regime not as capable as it could be of nucleating
international action against transgressors. This has a disturbing
ramification. So deficient a regime could, on past experience,
suffer a sudden flight of international confidence if it were
to be confronted by allegations of grave noncompliance—irrespective
of whether the allegations were true or, as many in the past have
proved to be, false. The danger might then be that the treaties
would become a liability, not an asset, in the overall array,
[78]
in which eventually the norms themselves may erode.
7. This prospect has two implications for
policy. First, the BWC Protocol must be concluded as a matter
of high urgency, and it must be an instrument with real teeth,
not just another declaration. Second, the transparency of the
CWC regime must be increased: the OPCW must not be discovered,
should the crunch ever come, to be a sort of pre-UNSCOM IAEA—its
challenge-inspection procedures unimplementable, perhaps, or its
inspectorate blind to chemicals not expressly on its control lists.
8. In both these respects what the United
States does is crucial. The main reason why the CWC verification
system is not yet fully operational is the great length of time
that country has been taking to open its civil chemical industry
to the forms of international inspection which the CWC requires
and to which most of the rest of the world's industry has now
been subject for two years. By mid-2000, however, this US lag
phase seems likely to have ended, in which case the way may then
be set for US industry to discover, as UK industry has apparently
already discovered, that erstwhile concerns about the impositions
of the control regime, and its possible threats to investment,
are mostly unfounded. US engagement with the BWC Protocol negotiation
could then become altogether more concerted and constructive than
has thus far been the case. Provided the currently awkward positions
of countries such as China and India can be accommodated, completion
of a satisfactory Protocol might be achieved not too far into
the post-Clinton era.
9. The UK, which occupies a key Friend-of-the-Chair
position in the BWC Protocol negotiation, has become obliged to
mediate between opposing blocs of allies within the Western Group.
In this and other tasks, the UK delegation needs all the support
it can get, not least protection against imposition of counterproductive
deadlines.
10. With regard to the needs of the CWC,
the UK is again in a position to contribute much. It is a member
of the OPCW Executive Council. It has a track-record of constructive
and expert participation in the affairs of the OPCW, including
resolution of both outstanding and pending issues. But because
the CWC has moved from negotiation into implementation, the UK
lead has passed from the FCO to the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI), which is the designated National Authority for the CWC.
The UK National Authority (UKNA) has thus far submitted three
annual reports to Parliament, as required by statute,[79]
and is currently finalising its report on activities during calendar
year 1999. These reports have been drafted with close attention
to detail and, as Parliament recommended when making them statutory,
are now seen in draft by an advisory committee.[80]
How much Parliamentary attention they have then received is not
obvious from the public record.
11. The UKNA annual reports describe how
the UK is actually implementing the CWC, including those compliance-assuring
tasks which, through the division of labour noted in paragraph
5 above, fall to the National Authorities rather than the OPCW
Technical Secretariat. Such tasks extend to the UK obligation,
under CWC Article VI.2, to adopt the necessary measures
to ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only developed,
produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, or used within
its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or
control for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.
Among the myriad toxic chemicals and their precursors that are
known to exist or that may yet be discovered, the OPCW Technical
Secretariat is sighted only towards those 29 chemicals and 14
families of chemicals that are listed in the CWC Annex on Chemicals
and on which state parties are therefore obliged to declare industrial
data to the OPCW and accept routine inspections to validate their
declarations. It is the National Authorities, therefore, not the
OPCW Technical Secretariat, that are primarily responsible for
implementing a provision of the CWC—the general purpose
criterion—which for the reasons set out below in paragraph
12 is absolutely vital to the future of the treaty. UKNA, it goes
without saying, is fully aware of this. But the provision is not
at all easy or costless to implement, and it is important that
this be properly appreciated. UKNA's efforts to cope are worthy
of wider recognition and support, not least because, regrettably,
they are unmatched elsewhere. The UK has once again assumed a
standard-bearing role in the international BWC/CWC enterprise.
12. As in Article VI.2 just quoted, the
general purpose criterion is used in the CWC to define the scope
of the treaty.[81]
Through it, the CWC is not in fact a prohibition of chemical weapons
at all, but of particular purposes to which chemicals may be put.
The negotiators had two main reasons for adopting this approach.
First, many chemicals are dual purpose in the sense
that they can as well be used for chemical warfare as for beneficent
peaceful purposes; so the chemicals themselves could not be banned,
only certain applications of them. Second, if the treaty had simply
listed the substances whose purposes were to be controlled, it
could be overtaken by advances in science applicable in hitherto
unknown forms of CBW armament. The device of the general purpose
criterion in the CWC is copied from the BWC. To have focused the
treaties on weapons, not purposes, could have harmed activities
on which the well-being of society depended and locked the control
regime into the technology of its birth-time, technology which,
sooner or later, would become obsolete. The responsibility falling
upon the National Authorities in this regard is therefore great.
The danger against which it is directed, however, does not appear
to be an immediate one, so it may perhaps be taken more lightly
than is prudent. It is striking that the UKNA annual report for
1998—the first in the series to receive glossy-brochure
treatment—makes no express mention of it.
13. Indeed, if one is to be critical of
UKNA's performance thus far, one may deplore its propensity, evident
in the annual reports, for hiding its light under a bushel: for
seeming to conceal rather than candidly to describe what it has
been doing. True, the annual report is, strictly speaking, only
about the operation of the Chemical Weapons Act 1996; but the
purpose of that Act is to create powers enabling effective implementation
of the CWC in this country. Besides the general purpose criterion,
there is a second area in which a more informative annual report
could be particularly beneficial. CWC Article VII.4 requires each
National Authority to serve as the national focal point
for effective liaison with the [OPCW] and other States Parties.
This aspect of UKNA's work has not been reflected in the annual
reports except as regards OPCW activities on UK soil. Liaison
is not a one-way process, yet the annual reports present none
of the information that must have been gleaned through it on what
other states parties are doing or on other aspects of the OPCW's
work. A unique opportunity is therefore being lost for keeping
Parliament informed about the progress and effectiveness of the
CWC regime. While it is true that the confidentiality provisions
of the CWC would limit the detail of such reporting by UKNA, they
do not require total silence. The OPCW's own annual report, whose
quality might benefit from such competition (see paragraph 5 above),
indicates this.
14. There is at the present juncture a particular
need for more informative reporting by UKNA. If, as seems inevitable,
the impending US presidential election imposes a hiatus upon the
BWC Protocol negotiation, there will be opportunity for considering
possible reorientations of the enterprise. For example, much of
industry concern about the inspection provisions being proposed
for the BWC Protocol has to do with biotechnological processes
whose products are chemical rather than microbiological. In the
particular form of toxins and of anything else describable
as toxic, such products fall within the scope of the CWC's general
purpose criterion. One option might therefore be to negotiate
an expansion of the OPCW verification system into biology-based
industry and so reduce the burden being placed on the projected
BWC Protocol. The Protocol's compliance-verification system as
applied to manufacturing industry might then even be limited to
sectors of the industry where the product is a listed biological
organism. But evaluating such options needs rather detailed information
about how the OPCW verification system in fact operates, on both
sides of its national/international division of labour.
15. In conclusion, one further recommendation
for action is offered for consideration. The BWC/CWC regime rests
on the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which outlaws use in war of CBW weapons
and whose 75th anniversary falls on 17 June 2000. The FCO has
actively been promoting the universality of both the BWC and the
CWC. Should not this anniversary year be occasion for a renewed
effort to ensure that all states that have bound themselves to
the Geneva Protocol also bind themselves to its implicit CBW disarmament
obligation, by joining both the BWC and the CWC? In this most
ambivalent of categories—committed to abstain from CBW but
not from CBW armamant—are such states as Egypt, Iraq, Israel,
Libya, North Korea, Syria and Yugoslavia.
70 See, especially, G B Carter and G S Pearson, Past
British chemical warfare capabilities, RUSI Journal,
February 1996, pp 59-68.
71
Julian Robinson, Jeanne Guillemin and Matthew Meselson, Yellow
Rain: the story collapses, Foreign Policy no 68 (Fall
1987), pp 100-117.
72
See 10-11 September, Chemical Weapons Convention
Bulletin no 18 (December 1992), pp 12-13.
73
During the Kargil war last year: see 8 September [Jammu
and Kashmir], The CBW Conventions Bulletin no 46
(December 1999), p 27.
74
During the still-continuing war in Chechnya: see 5 October
[Moscow], The CBW Conventions Bulletin no 46 (December
1999), pp 33-34.
75
In southern Sudan during July and August last year: see 19
August [Sudan], The CBW Conventions Bulletin no 46
(December 1999), p 24.
76
When CS munitions were used by the Turkish army in an attack on
a PKK position in southeastern Turkey on 11 May last year that
reportedly resulted in the deaths of 20 Kurdish fighters: see
28 October [Turkey], The CBW Conventions Bulletin
no 46 (December 1999), p 41.
77
On the division of labour, see J P Perry Robinson, Implementing
the Chemical Weapons Convention, International Affairs,
vol 72, no 1 (January 1996), pp 73-89.
78
For example by continuing to consume resources that could better
sustain other elements of the array.
79
Chemical Weapons Act 1996, section 32.
80
HC Debs 23 Nov 95, cols 810-48; 6 Dec 95, cols 413-43; HL Debs
30 Jan 96, cols 1364-82; 27 Feb 96, cols 1428-48; 18 Mar 96, cols
1071-75; and 2 Apr 96, cols 148-51.
81
The main expression of the general purpose criterion is in Article
II.1(a), where it is said that the chemical weapons
of the Convention include Toxic chemicals and their precursors,
except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention,
as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes.
...
The proposed sacking of Mr Bustani was known in advance,
because the necessary meetings had to be coordinated with the Organization
so as to follow the procedure of dismissal.
In the House of Lords, questions were raised about the motives
of this action. The explanation for it -- that there were
financial difficulties -- is necessarily fudged because
the Director-General is not in control of whether the
member countries pay up on time or not. This makes it
tricky to pin the blame on the man they need to justify getting
rid of.
18 April 2002
Hansard source reference
debate
Chemical Weapons
Lord Rea:
My Lords, I beg leave to ask a Question of which I have given private notice, namely:...
What
Her Majesty's[will the] Government's position
will... be at the special meeting of the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to be held at The Hague
on 21st April, when it is anticipated that the United States will seek to
unseat its long-standing—and highly effective—director-general, Sr Jose Bustani.
Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:
My Lords, I can confirm that a special conference of states parties to the
chemical weapons convention will convene in The Hague on 21st April 2002
at the request of the United States to consider the appointment of the director-general
of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.... Her Majesty's
Government are still finalising their position.
However, your Lordships should
know that, at[At] the meeting of the executive council of the Organisation for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on 22nd March, the United Kingdom supported
a vote of no confidence in the director-general.
Lord Rea:
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that Answer. However, does[Does] she agree
that the real American objection to Sr Bustani is not to his failings, but
to his very success?
For example, he has increased the number of signatories
to the chemical weapons convention from 87 to 140 in the past five years. Such is
his success and his reputation for impartiality—quite apart from asking searching
questions about the United States' own chemical weapons—that it[It] is thought
that he might be able to persuade Iraq to join
and to adhere to... the chemical
weapons convention,
rather than to allow the return of UNMOVIC, which Iraq
considers to be US dominated. If that were the case, would it not[which would] remove
a major pretext for US military intervention in Iraq, which appears to be
the policy of the hawks in the United States Administration?
Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:
My Lords, I am afraid that I cannot agree with a great deal of my noble
friend's conjecture. The director-general did indeed have some successes
in the work that he undertook during his first period of office in establishing
the OPCW and in establishing a world-wide verification regime. But, sadly,
the[The] organisation encountered financial difficulties early in 2001, for which
the director-general must take
a measure of... responsibility.
I cannot agree
with the supposition that his period of office has been one of great success
when those[Those] financial problems led, last year, to his not being able to maintain
the appropriate level of inspections world-wide of military and commercial
sites.
As I understand it, towards the end of last year, the number of inspections
fell by almost 50 per cent of the normal annual schedule. We made representations
to the director-general on several occasions last year about our concerns
at the decline in verification activity. I believe that that is what lies
at the heart of the current difficulty....
Lord Avebury:
My Lords, is the Minister aware that it is grossly unfair to serve these
accusations in public on the director-general, when he has been given no
formal opportunity to rebut them, either in the conference of states parties
or in the executive council? Is it not contrary to natural justice that he
should be charged in this public manner without being given an adequate opportunity
to rebut the charges?... Does the Minister agree that, if the US is allowed
to intimidate and coerce other states, as it has done, into dismissing an
international civil servant, it will undermine the independence of all international
institutions? Do not the Government see a pattern developing with the attempts
by the US Administration, not only against the director-general of the OPCW
but also to undermine Mr Hans Blix, the head of UNMOVIC? Does the Minister
further agree that, if this procedure continues, no international institution
will be able to claim full independence?
Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:
My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord is not bracketing me in what he describes
as unfairness. When I am asked a Question in this House, I must give the
Answer that I believe is accurate and which accurately reflects the position
of Her Majesty's Government.
I
indicated to the House that the Government are still finalising their position.
The reason is that the Secretary of State has not come to a final decision.
However, I felt it right in the circumstances
to indicate to your Lordships how we had voted at the executive council.
To have done anything else would have been misleading. I felt it right to
give your Lordships some of the reasons for doing so, as I was asked to do.
Her Majesty's Government were not alone with the United States in reaching
that decision on a vote of no confidence during the executive meeting in
March. Seventeen countries out of the 40 represented voted for a motion of
no confidence; 18 abstained; and five opposed the motion of no confidence.
That is a fairly telling list of votes.
Lord Richard:
My Lords, is my noble friend aware that it would perhaps be more profitable
for the House to consider the British reasons for not accepting this gentleman
and for voting for a motion of no confidence in him, rather than over-speculating
as to the motivation of the United States in this matter? Will my noble friend
reiterate and clarify the reasons why the British Government could not support
him?
Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:
My Lords, as I indicated, the organisation encountered some financial difficulties
early last year. As I understand it from the briefings that I have received,
those difficulties were rooted in structural problems within the organisation
and in the fact that some states parties had not paid their contributions
on time; and there was a degree of mismanagement in the organisation. We
and other states parties wanted to get to the bottom of the problem. As I
have indicated, we were concerned about the verification procedures and about
maintaining the level of verification, both military and commercial. We asked
the director-general to co-operate with an effort to get to the bottom of
the problems, and I understand that he did not co-operate in the way that
we would have expected.
Baroness Williams of Crosby:
My Lords, will the Minister confirm that both the United Kingdom Government
and the United States Government made their contributions to the organisation
on time?
Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:
My Lords, I shall have to check on that point. The United Kingdom Government
have a very good record in these matters, and I shall check on the further
matter.
Lord Bruce of Donington:
My Lords, it is often the custom in this House for reference to be made
to briefings. Will the noble Baroness give the House an assurance that members
of the Government do not invariably rely on briefings, but on what they themselves
think?
Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:
My Lords, I hate to disabuse the noble Lord, but I will be frank with him
and tell him that I was not aware of the difficulty until I saw the Private
Notice Question of the noble Lord, Lord Rea. I would not expect to be aware
of the difficulty because it does not lie within my specific area of responsibility.
However, my right honourable friend the Secretary
of State is aware, as is my honourable friend Mr Bradshaw. They have front-line
responsibilities for the matters, but I argue for them in your Lordships'
House. I would not wish any noble Lord to be under any illusion at all: I
have relied on official briefings in giving my answer to your Lordships.
[...]
Lord Rea:
My Lords, my noble friend spoke of the organisation's financial difficulty
in fulfilling its inspection tasks.... Is she aware that the United States put
a cap on its funding, but was then one of the nations that failed to pay
its dues?
Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:
No
, my Lords,... I was not aware of the United States' position in that respect;
nor am I aware of the funding coming forward from any other individual country.
However, I can say that the United States, Japan, Germany, Italy, France
and the United Kingdom together provide 70 per cent of the organisation's
funding. I have not been able to answer in detail the question put by the
noble Baroness, Lady Williams, or that put by my noble friend. I shall, if
I may, take away those points, write to the noble Baroness and my noble friend,
and place a copy of the answer in the Library of the House.
...
Several vigilant MPs began submitting written questions over the following weeks. They got the same unsatisfactory
answer over and over again.
There were unspecified, and possibly unfounded, financial difficulties; and other countries had voted against him.
24 April 2002
Hansard source reference
writtenquestions
Mr. Bustani
Joan Ruddock:
To ask the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs... what his policy is in relation to the demand of the USA for the removal of Mr. Bustani from his position
as Head of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons....
Mr. Bradshaw:
The United Kingdom's policy has been determined by the overriding need to ensure the long-term viability and effectiveness of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).... It was clear that the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) had lost the confidence of a significant number of the organisation's executive council.
For this reason we concluded that the interests of the OPCW and the CWC would be best served if the Director-General were to be replaced by someone who could enjoy the full confidence of all states parties to the convention. The United Kingdom delegation to the Special Conference of States Parties, which convened on 21 April, was guided by this position. The matter came to a vote at the Special Conference on 22 April. The outcome was 48 votes in support of the termination of the Director-General's appointment, with seven votes against and 43 abstentions. The Director-General's appointment was therefore terminated with immediate effect....
8 May 2002
Hansard source reference
writtenquestions
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
Lynne Jones:
To ask the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (1)... if he will make a statement on the reasons for the Government's
decision to vote in favour of a... vote of no confidence in Jose Bustani, Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons ;
(2) if he will make a statement on the decision of Her Majesty's Government to vote to remove the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons....
Mr. Bradshaw:
Our policy throughout this matter has been guided by our judgment of what is in the best interests of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)....
Mr. Bustani had lost the confidence of a significant number of the OPCW's Executive Council.
At a Special Conference of the OPCW on 21 April, 48 states parties voted for the resolution to terminate Mr. Bustani's appointment, 43 abstained and only seven voted against. Every European Union country voted for the resolution (except France, which abstained), as did other key countries like India, Australia, Canada and Japan. Mr. Bustani's appointment was accordingly terminated with immediate effect....
The Special Conference also called for states parties to nominate candidates for the vacancy of Director General as soon as possible, and for the Executive Council to meet before 31 May to consider the nominations and decide on a recommendation to put to the conference before 10 June.
...
Llew Smith:
To ask the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs... for what reasons the United Kingdom voted
on 22 April at the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons... for the removal of the OPCW Director General from his post;
and if he will make a statement on Jose Bustani's replacement....
Mr. Bradshaw:
Our policy throughout this matter has been guided by our judgment of what is in the best interests of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)....
Mr. Bustani had lost the confidence of a significant number of the OPCW's Executive Council.
At a special conference of the OPCW on 21 April, 48 states parties voted for the resolution to terminate Mr. Bustani's appointment, 43 abstained and only seven voted against. Every European Union country voted for the resolution (except France, which abstained), as did other key countries like India, Australia, Canada and Japan. Mr. Bustani's appointment was accordingly terminated with immediate effect....
The special conference also called for states parties to nominate candidates for the vacancy of Director General as soon as possible, and for the Executive Council to meet before 31 May to consider the nominations and decide on a recommendation to put to the conference before 10 June.
...
14 May 2002
Hansard source reference
writtenquestions
Chemical Weapons
Mr. Best:
To ask the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs... if he will set out the reasons for the dismissal of Mr. J. Bustani
, Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons....
Mr. Bradshaw:
A significant number of countries on the Organisation's Executive Council had lost confidence in Mr. Bustani. At a special conference called specifically to decide on the matter, a substantial majority voted to terminate his appointment.
21 May 2002
Hansard source reference
writtenquestions
Chemical Weapons
Andrew Mackinlay:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what the states that he described in his letter of 19 March to José Bustani as OPCW's main member states were. [58331]
Mr. Bradshaw:
In this context, the 41 member states drawn from all regional groups represented on the Executive Council—the executive organ of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
Andrew Mackinlay: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what complaints were made by the Chief Financial Officer of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in respect of the financial management of the organisation. [58320]
Mr. Bradshaw:
There is no post with the title of Chief Financial Officer at the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). However, the former Director-General, as Chief Executive Officer of the OPCW Technical Secretariat did, on occasions, criticise the staff working under him in the financial areas of the Secretariat.
[...]
Andrew Mackinlay:
To ask the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs... what the differences between OPCS's main member states and José Bustani referred to by the Foreign Secretary in his letter to Mr. Bustani dated 19 March were.
Mr. Bradshaw:
The differences between Mr. Bustani and states represented on the Executive Council of the OPCW, centred on the financial and administrative management of the organisation.
Andrew Mackinlay:
To ask the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs... what recent complaints were made about the Chief Financial Officer to member states of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
in respect of the financial management of the organisation.
...
Mr. Bradshaw:
There is no post of Chief Financial Officer at the
Organisation for the Prevention of Chemical... Weapons (OPCW). However, a number of complaints about the former Director-General
—the Chief Executive Officer of the OPCW—...were published by the United States.
These mainly related to the failure to monitor expenditure in 2000, leading to a deficit; failure to explain financial problems arising in 2001; and presentation of unrealistically high budgetary bids....
...
Andrew Mackinlay:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on what occasions Dame Rosemary Spencer made representations to José Bustani on behalf of Her Majesty's Government that were critical of his stewardship, or the direction, of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons during her period as ambassador.
[...]
Andrew Mackinlay:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on what occasions the UK ambassador to the Hague made representations to José Bustani that were critical of (a) his stewardship and (b) the direction of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
prior to the latter's dismissal....
Mr. Bradshaw:
The then British ambassador (Dame Rosemary Spencer) joined other major financial contributors in a call on Mr. Bustani, on 23 February 2001, to express our concern at his decision to apply major cuts to the verification programme.
On 6 April 2001, the UK representative to the OPCW Executive Council took part in a similar call, urging a more co-operative approach, pressing for assurances that financial controls had been put in place to correct evident shortcomings, and requesting revision of Mr. Bustani's 2002 budget proposals. The UK representative on the Executive Council had made similar points in a private meeting with Mr. Bustani on 5 April 2001.... The current British ambassador (Colin Budd) met with Mr. Bustani on 15 March 2002 to inform him that the UK believed that it would be in the best interests of the OPCW and the chemical weapons convention if he were to resign.
22 May 2002
Hansard source reference
writtenquestions
José Bustani
Mr. Laurence Robertson:
To ask the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs... what discussions he has had with the United States Government about their stance on the position of José Bustani in the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
Mr. Bradshaw:
My right hon. Friend... the Foreign Secretary spoke with the United States Secretary of State about the matter in a telephone conversation on 1 March 2002.
24 May 2002
Hansard source reference
writtenquestions
Chemical Weapons
Helen Jackson:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs how the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons will be governed until a replacement for Jose Bustani is appointed.
Mr. Bradshaw:
The Executive Council, which is the Executive organ of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, will continue to function as normal. Its next meeting is on 31 May. The Director-General heads the Technical Secretariat that is responsible for assisting the Executive Council in the performance of its function. Until a new Director-General is appointed, the Technical Secretariat will be headed by the Deputy Director-General.
Helen Jackson:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs when he expects a new Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to be appointed.
Mr. Bradshaw:
The Special Conference of States Parties (The Hague, 21–24 April) decided that it would reconvene no later than 10 June to appoint a new Director-General, following the formal recommendation of the Executive Council which is due to meet on 31 May.
Helen Jackson:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will list the countries that are members of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
Mr. Bradshaw:
There are currently 145 State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). All States Parties to the CWC are members of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). They are as follows: Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Fiji, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
[...]
Lynne Jones:
To ask the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (1)... how many chemical weapons inspectors have been employed by the OPCW in each year since its creation; and what the projected numbers are for 2003;
(2) if he will list the staff at directorate and branch head level in the OPCW, together with the nationality of the (a) current and (b) immediate past incumbent....
Mr. Bradshaw:
We do not hold this information. We will make enquiries and I will write to my hon. Friend, and place a copy of the letter in the Library of the House.
Lynne Jones:
To ask the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, pursuant to the answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Blaneau Gwent (Llew Smith), of 8 May, Official Report, column 241W, on the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,... if he will make a statement on the reasons underlying his assessement that Mr. Bustani has lost confidence of a significant number of the OPCW's Executive Council.
Mr. Bradshaw:
The assessment was based on the views expressed by members of the OPCW represented on the Executive Council. It was borne out by the subsequent vote in which 17 supported the vote of no confidence, 18 abstained and only 5 opposed.
Lynne Jones:
To ask the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs... what his definition is of major shareholder in the context of member states of the OPCW; and what the implications are of the definition for the independence of the organisations.
Mr. Bradshaw:
There is no agreed definition of a major shareholder in the context of the OPCW.... The use of this term has no implications for the independence of the Organisation, where each member has one vote.
This term has, however, occasionally been used to describe those members who have continually been represented on the Executive Council, and the six largest financial contributors who provide approximately 70 per cent of the OPCW budget (the US, Japan, Germany, France, the UK and Italy)....
At this point, Mr. Bradshaw was retired from his duty of
not properly answering the question, and another Government
minster took his place.
18 June 2002
Hansard source reference
writtenquestions
Chemical Weapons
Lynne Jones:
To ask the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs..., pursuant
to the answer
to the hon. Member for Thurrock (Andrew Mackinlay)... of 21 May 2002,
Official Report,
column 261W, on the OPCW,... if he will make a statement on the financial and
administrative management differences referred to.
Mr. Mike O'Brien:
We understood the main financial and administrative differences to be:
(a) The failure of the OPCW Secretariat to implement the Financial Regulations
in 2000, leading to expenditure exceeding income by £2.5 million.
(b) Presentation by the Secretariat of incomplete and occasionally inaccurate information on the financial situation in 2001.
(c) The drastic cuts in the operational programme intended to resolve the 2001
financial situation, before the scale of the problem was clear and the options
evaluated.
(d) Presentation of unrealistic budgetary proposals, over a number of years, that required extensive revision.
(e) The handling of a staff grading review which led to legal action at the ILO
Administrative Tribunal, and the handling of action subsequent to the ILO
judgment.
Lynne Jones:
To ask the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs..., pursuant
to the answer
to the hon. Member for Thurrock (Andrew Mackinlay)... of 21 May
2002
, Official Report, columns 261–62W, on the OPCW..., if he will list the evident shortcomings referred to.
Mr. Mike O'Brien:
The shortcomings relate to the failure to comply with the OPCW financial
regulations. These regulations require the Director-General to prudently
manage appropriations . . . to ensure that expenditures can be kept within
funds available.... Expenditure in 2000 exceeded income by £2.5 million.
The
OPCW external auditor's report on the 2000 financial statements confirmed
that these provisions had not been complied with and recommended corrective
action. The external auditor also drew attention to the failure to comply
with regulations governing transfers of funds between appropriations, and
recommended action to minimise excessive use of transfers....
Lynne Jones:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, pursuant to his answer of 24 May 2002, Official Report, column 603W, if he will make a statement on (a) the views expressed by the members of the OPCW represented on the Executive Council, and (b) the views expressed by the UK at that time.
Mr. Mike O'Brien:
A significant number of the members of the Executive Council expressed the
view that they had lost confidence in the Director-General. As a result,
the UK concluded that it would be in the best interests of the OPCW and the
Chemical Weapons Convention if the Director-General were to step down voluntarily
to make way for someone who could enjoy the full confidence of all the members
of the organisation. The Director-General was informed of the UK's position
prior to the vote of no confidence at the Executive Council meeting in March.
[...]
This was too much. Lynne Jones MP threw the detailed and
almost entirely vacuous answer back into the system for a second try.
The response is a whole bunch more words and figures that make little sense to the reader. Notice that minister is listing percentages of
budget beside each quantity of money. This is a desperate
attempt to show that financial difficulties were
both small and large at the same time so that blame can
be manufactured out of thin air. The Director-General also
gets censured for cutting the inspection regimes to account
to his budgetary limits, while on the other hand running out of money.
4 July 2002
Hansard source reference
writtenquestions
Chemical Weapons
Lynne Jones:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, pursuant to his answer of 18 June 2002, Official Report, column 293W, whether the term income refers to cash available from contributions to (a) the OPCW Secretariat and (b)
the agreed budget of the OPCW; by when the major budgetary contributors to
the OPCW budget finished paying their contributions in each of the last five
years; (i) what the role of the Head of Administration in the OPCW is and
(ii) from which country this post-holder came in 2001; if he will make a
statement on the monthly statements made by Mr. José Bustani covering the
operational programme; if he will make a statement regarding the use of the
term unrealistic; whether the revised budget of the OPCW addresses the concerns
over the previous OPCW budget proposals referred to; how many member states
of the OPCW there were in each of the last five years; what the UK Government's
estimate is of the frequency of inspections (A) proposed for the major budgetary
contributors to the OPCW under the budgetary proposals referred to and (B)
for the major budgetary contributors to the OPCW under the current budgetary
proposals; and if he will make a statement on the action of the Conference
of States Parties in the handling of the staff grading review referred to.
Mr. Mike O'Brien:
The term income referred to the income of the OPCW from the usual three
sources: contributions from member states in accordance with assessments
adopted by the Conference of States Parties; payments by declared possessors
of chemical weapons in respect of costs incurred by the OPCW in verifying
chemical weapons destruction; and interest on cash deposits held....
We
do not have precise information on the timing of payments by member states.
Our understanding is that all the major contributors paid their assessed
contributions by mid-year in each of the past five years....
The
Head of the Administrative Division of the OPCW supervises the work of the
budget and finance branch, the human resources branch, the information systems
branch, the procurement and support services branch and the training and
staff development branch. The post was vacant throughout much of 2001: it
was occupied by a US national early in the year, and succeeded in September
by another US national.
The
OPCW Secretariat, through much of 2001, issued monthly statements on income
and expenditure. The Director-General included commentary on the operational
programme in his statements to Executive Council meetings and in separate
briefings of delegations through the year, where he outlined the cuts to
the operational programmes he believed were
needed to keep within anticipated income; and reported on progress in delivering
what remained of the operational programmes. The Executive Council, on receipt
of these reports, requested further authoritative information; requested
specific proposals to deal with problems identified; expressed concerns about
proposed cuts in operational programmes; authorised the use of all available
cash to finance credible levels of verification activity and international
co-operation and assistance.
The
first draft of the 2000 budget proposed 12 per cent. growth over 1999; 2001
draft proposed 17 per cent. growth over 2000; 2002 draft proposed 24 per
cent. over 2001; and the preliminary draft put to ABAF (Advisory Body on
Administrative and Financial matters) in respect of 2003 proposed 29 per
cent. growth over 2002. During these years, the norm in most international
organisations was zero growth, and OPCW member states regularly made clear
each year their belief that the draft budget should much more closely reflect
the financial and political reality, so as to provide a sound basis for negotiations.
At
Entry-into-Force on 29 April 1997, there were 87 States Parties. At 31 December
1997—105; 31 Dec 1998—121; 31 Dec 1999—128; 31 Dec 2000—141; 31 Dec 2001
(and today)—145.
OPCW
industrial inspection targets are in many respects randomly selected by the
Technical Secretariat, so it is not possible to estimate with any accuracy
the likely frequency of inspections to be faced in any country or group of
countries. Previous budget proposals have provided an indication of numbers
of inspections planned for the various categories of industrial facilities
subject to declaration and inspection. The current budget proposal for 2003
under consideration in the Executive Council makes comparable projections
based on current risk assessments which, if implemented, we estimate would
tend to provide a more global coverage by the OPCW. If total inspection numbers
remain broadly the same as in past years, as is currently forecast, this
shift in emphasis could perhaps slightly reduce inspection frequency in 2003
for some of the major contributors, relative to what might have been expected
from budget projections in previous years.
The
Director-General, in August 1998, published a grading review conducted by
an outside consultant, together with his intended actions in respect of the
review, including his decision to implement, effective 1 January 1999, all
the grade changes recommended. In October 1998, the Director-General noted
to the Executive Council his understanding that some member states had reservations
about the funding needed to implement the grading recommendations. In November
1998, the Conference of States Parties decided that the reclassification
of posts involved should be discussed and decided by States Parties at a
later stage, and requested the Director-General meanwhile not to implement
the study. The Conference of States Parties in July 1999 reiterated its request
to the Director-General not to implement the 1998 staff grading review, and
requested him to initiate a new classification study once terms of reference
were approved by the Executive Council. In June 1999, OPCW staff members
filed complaints with the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour
Organisation, an action joined later by a total of 89 staff. The Tribunal
concluded that, in August 1998, the Director-General
had had the competence for classification of posts, and that the re-classification
announced should therefore have proceeded on 1 January 1999. The concern
of many States Parties was that the basis of the grading review was open
to question, the Director-General's decision to implement it was premature,
and he had no budgetary authority to incur the significant additional costs
that would arise.
Since
the recent change in leadership the situation at the OPCW has improved with
indications that better staff morale and planning are leading to greater
efficiency and effectiveness.
...
Lynne Jones:
To ask the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, pursuant to his answer of 18 June 2002, Official Report,
column 294W, if there is a role for member states of the OPCW in approving
the transfers of funds referred to;... and if he will make a statement on the
(a) reasons given for the loss of confidence referred to and (b) late payments by member states of the OPCW.
Mr. Mike O'Brien:
The OPCW Financial Regulations provide for transfers of appropriated funds
between programmes. Transfers of up to 10 per cent. of the original appropriation
may be made by the Director-General, and reported to the Executive Council;
transfers over 10 per cent. may be made only with the prior concurrence of
the Executive Council. All transfers should be reported to the Conference
of States Parties....
The
loss of confidence in the former Director-General by a significant number
of members of the OPCW Executive Council we believe arose largely from the
financial and administrative concerns noted in the answer I gave to my hon.
Friend on 18 June 2002, Official Report, columns 293–294W. ...There was
also... a perception
among many Executive Council members... that the former Director-General
took an unnecessarily confrontational approach in his dealings with the Executive
Council
, to the detriment of the effective functioning of the OPCW, and contrary
to the supportive role envisaged in Article VIII of the Chemical Weapons
Convention....
As
at 31 May 2002, 19 States Parties had outstanding sums due in respect of
1997 assessed contributions, totalling about £114,000 or 0.5 per cent. of
that year's budget. The figures for 1998 are 29 States Parties, £177,000
(0.5 per cent.); for 1999, 31 States Parties, £50,000 (0.2 per cent.); for
2000, 28 States Parties, £76,000 (0.3 per cent.); for 2001, 50 States Parties,
£590,000 (1.7 per cent.). So far in 2002, to 18 June, 76 States Parties have
paid their 2002 assessed contributions in full and another 13 have made part
payments totalling £34.75 million (95.6 per cent. of the budget).... 56 States
Parties have yet to pay any of their assessed contributions for 2002, amounting
to £1.625 million (4.5 per cent. of the budget).
The UK pays in full and
on time, and takes every opportunity to urge all States Parties to do likewise....
This story does not have a happy resolution. Mr Bustani himself became the Brazilian ambassador to England in March the following year. However, interest
in this case was lost, and public attention was over-run by even more outrageous events to come on the subject of Iraq.
The Government proved again that it was effectively unaccountable for its actions. When they are willing to push it, they know that reason and acceptability can ultimately be witnessed in the eyes of the beholder.
The more people who can watch and make a stand against situations of
bogus reasoning when they are being perpetrated, the less
painlessly they can get away with it. Ideally, they shouldn't even try.
In the meantime, we have a situation where politics is getting played
with the Chemical Weapons Convention; the Prohibition of these weapons is not seen as a worthy goal in contrast to other short-term needs. The forces which succeeded in this
action failed to unseat Dr. Hans Blix from his position as the investigator of banned weapons in Iraq.
If you have any comments about the format and style of this
window onto the official record, please respond to julian@publicwhip.org.uk The effectiveness of this form of reportage, and how it can be applied to other stories, is a focus of ongoing research.
29 October 2003.