The debate on the day the first dossier of evidence was published, for which parliament had been recalled:
Blair said:
[Saddam's] weapons of mass destruction programme is active, detailed and growing. The policy of containment is not working. The weapons of mass destruction programme is not shut down; it is up and running now.
The intelligence picture ... is extensive, detailed and authoritative. It concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons ... which could be activated within 45 minutes, ... and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability.
Saddam has bought or attempted to buy specialised vacuum pumps of the design needed for the gas centrifuge cascade to enrich uranium; an entire magnet production line of the specification for use in the motors and top bearings of gas centrifuges; dual-use products, such as anhydrous hydrogen fluoride and fluoride gas, which can be used both in petrochemicals but also in gas centrifuge cascades; a filament winding machine, which can be used to manufacture carbon fibre gas centrifuge rotors; and he has attempted, covertly, to acquire 60,000 or more specialised aluminium tubes, which are subject to strict controls owing to their potential use in the construction of gas centrifuges.
[W]e know that Saddam has been trying to buy significant quantities of uranium from Africa... [O]f course, the weapons require ballistic missile capability... It is clear that a significant number of longer-range missiles were effectively concealed from the previous inspectors and remain, including up to 20 extended-range Scud missiles; that in mid-2001 there was a step change in the programme and, by this year, Iraq's development of weapons with a range of more than 1,000 km was well under way; and that hundreds of people are employed in that programme, facilities are being built and equipment procured -- usually clandestinely.
Mr. Elfyn Llwyd (Meirionnydd Nant Conwy) asked:
Has [The Prime Minister] given the United States any commitment that the United Kingdom would support unilateral action against Iraq?
The Prime Minister replied:
As I said a moment ago, we are not at the stage of taking decisions about military action.
It was a debate without a proper vote. Paul Flynn (Newport, West) made a point of order:
[M]y constituents -- and many of them have spoken to me -- will not understand why I cannot vote today against following the Bush agenda.
With nothing to vote on, except a procedural motion that the House should adjourn, the day eventually ended. Votes not to adjourn were cast by those opposed to the war (marked in column 1 by an empty circle), but the House adjourned anyway because after ten o'clock such decisions are void.
The House adopted the following motion:
"That this House supports UNSCR 1441 as unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council; agrees that the Government of Iraq must comply fully with all provisions of the Resolution; and agrees that, if it fails to do so, the Security Council should meet in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance."
The MPs in marked in column 2 rejected the following amendment:
Add to the end of the motion: "and believes that any decision that Iraq is in material breach of Resolution 1441 is for the UN Security Council as a whole to determine and that no military action to enforce Resolution 1441 should be taken against Iraq without a mandate from the UN Security Council; and further believes that no British forces should be committed to any such military action against Iraq without a debate in this House and a substantive motion in favour."
During the debate, Mr. Neil Gerrard (Walthamstow), said:
I say to colleagues who are considering how to vote that I suspect they will not have a second chance. Please do not support the Government motion in the belief that, at some point, before any military action, there will be the opportunity to vote on that military action. I do not believe that they will have that opportunity. I ask every hon. Member to think about that before deciding how to vote.
But there were two further debating days in which the majority of members of the House chose again the path to war, in spite of massive public outrage, and routine unmasking of every single lie that was presented to justify the invasion
A second dossier of evidence was published by the Prime Minister's office, using years out-of-date information plagarized from a Californian student's PhD thesis on the web.
Such was the low quality of this propaganda effort that it was dubbed the "dodgy dossier", apologies were offered, accepted, and the whole embarrassing episode has been forgotten as though it has never happened.
The House adopted the following motion, on the votes of the MPs marked in column 3:
"That this House takes note of Command Paper Cm5769 on Iraq; reaffirms its endorsement of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, as expressed in its Resolution of 25th November 2002; supports the Government's continuing efforts in the United Nations to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction; and calls upon Iraq to recognise this as its final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations."
The members marked in column 4 rejected the following amendment to the motion:
To leave out from "destruction" to end and add: "but finds the case for military action against Iraq as yet unproven."
During the debate, there was very little mention of the unprecedented marches around the world on February 15. Mr. George Foulkes (Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley) said:
I want to put on record that I support my Government -- not out of loyalty, although that is not a bad reason -- but because I think that they are right. [S]upporting the Government today does not mean that one is in favour of war ... I do not doubt the sincerity of the majority of those who oppose Government policy, but ... I saw no placards on those marches saying, "Saddam must go". I saw no mention of the 2 million dead in the two wars.
Simon Hughes (Southwark, North and Bermondsey) pointed out:
If the right hon. Gentleman reads the record, he will know that both sides of the House have condemned Saddam Hussein for years. Surely he understands that those of us who marched, and were proud to march, did so because we believe that when advisers to the Security Council say that they want more time and that they might be able to achieve disarmament if they had it, that is a road to disarmament by peace that must be preferable to a road to disarmament by war.
Mr. Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) said:
If war happens in the next few weeks hon. Members must ask themselves whether it is legitimate to believe that such action had already been determined and had been remorselessly unfolding for many months. Many people believe that. It is why middle England and those of moderate political opinions have so many doubts. To many of my constituents, the answer to the questions, "Did Washington determine such action many months ago?"
Mr. George Galloway (Glasgow, Kelvin) said:
This is a defining moment. For the first time in many years, Parliament has an opportunity truly to shape world events... [I]f this Parliament sends the message tonight that the British people are not with this adventure, it will have a decisive impact on opinion in the United States of America. We are always told that it is too early to vote on war until it is too late. This is our last opportunity meaningfully to affect the course of these great events, and hon. Members are fooling themselves if they do not acknowledge that. We all know what the public want...
This debate is about one man ... George W. Bush... This is an American presidency that people on the Labour Benches would not have been seen dead with. This is an Administration ... who broke all the international treaties, who walked away from every international effort held dear by Labour Members.
But our democratically accountable Members of Parliament were given one more chance to pull the rug from under this operation before it commenced.
Two days before the night-time bombing of Baghdad in an operation called "Shock and Awe", the House once again debated the wisdom of this action, and once again its members failed to stop it. The wordy motion was put and carried by the votes of the MPs in column 5:
That this House notes its decisions of 25th November 2002 and 26th February 2003 to endorse UN Security Council Resolution 1441; // recognises that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and long range missiles, and its continuing non-compliance with Security Council Resolutions, pose a threat to international peace and security; notes that in the 130 days since Resolution 1441 was adopted Iraq has not co-operated actively, unconditionally and immediately with the weapons inspectors, and has rejected the final opportunity to comply and is in further material breach of its obligations under successive mandatory UN Security Council Resolutions; regrets that despite sustained diplomatic effort by Her Majesty's Government it has not proved possible to secure a second Resolution in the UN because one Permanent Member of the Security Council made plain in public its intention to use its veto whatever the circumstances; notes the opinion of the Attorney General that, Iraq having failed to comply and Iraq being at the time of Resolution 1441 and continuing to be in material breach, the authority to use force under Resolution 678 has revived and so continues today; believes that the United Kingdom must uphold the authority of the United Nations as set out in Resolution 1441 and many Resolutions preceding it, and therefore supports the decision of Her Majesty's Government that the United Kingdom should use all means necessary to ensure the disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction; offers wholehearted support to the men and women of Her Majesty's Armed Forces now on duty in the Middle East; // in the event of military operations requires that, on an urgent basis, the United Kingdom should seek a new Security Council Resolution that would affirm Iraq's territorial integrity, ensure rapid delivery of humanitarian relief, allow for the earliest possible lifting of UN sanctions, an international reconstruction programme, and the use of all oil revenues for the benefit of the Iraqi people and endorse an appropriate post-conflict administration for Iraq, leading to a representative government which upholds human rights and the rule of law for all Iraqis; and also welcomes the imminent publication of the Quartet's roadmap as a significant step to bringing a just and lasting peace settlement between Israelis and Palestinians and for the wider Middle East region, and endorses the role of Her Majesty's Government in actively working for peace between Israel and Palestine.
The members marked in column 6 had previously rejected the following amendment to the motion:
To replace the text between the "//" signs with: "believes that the case for war against Iraq has not yet been established, especially given the absence of specific United Nations authorisation; but, in the event that hostilities do commence, pledges its total support for the British forces engaged in the Middle East, expresses its admiration for their courage, skill and devotion to duty, and hopes that their tasks will be swiftly concluded with minimal casualties on all sides."
During the debate, Mr. Alex Salmond (Banff and Buchan) said:
The ... French, Russians and Chinese always made it clear that they would oppose a second resolution that led automatically to war... A month ago, [the Prime Minister] said that the only circumstances in which he would go to war without a second resolution was if the inspectors concluded that there had been no more progress, which they have not; if there were a majority on the Security Council, which there is not; and if there were an unreasonable veto from one country, but there are three permanent members opposed to the Prime Minister's policy.
The leader of our loyal Opposition, Mr. Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green), said:
Saddam Hussein has the means, the mentality and the motive to pose a direct threat to our national security. That is why we will be voting tonight to do the right thing by our troops and the British people.
Mr. Robert N. Wareing (Liverpool, West Derby) intervened:
... [I]s the right hon. Gentleman aware that, between 1986 and 1991, 12 early-day motions were tabled in this House calling for the abandonment of the supply of arms to Iraq and condemning what happened at Halabja, and that all the 60 Members who signed at least one of those motions were Labour Members? Not a single Tory name was included. [N]ot even the [current] Prime Minister signed any of them.
The speaker stopped him so that the leader of the opposition could continue his important speech:
Saddam Hussein has the means and the mentality. He also has the motive... The threat that his arsenal poses to British citizens at home and abroad cannot simply be contained... [T]hose who doubt that... are living in cloud cuckoo land.
John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) said:
I would respect [the Prime Minister] more if he gave us a free vote instead of a three-line Whip.
We cannot simply erase the US ambassador's commitment to UN Security Council partners that resolution 1441 contained no hidden triggers and "no automaticity".
In the past 12 months, we have been treated to a global propaganda exercise to persuade us of the need to attack Iraq... Most people have seen through [it]... They have been offended by the use of the memories of those who died on 11 September to justify dusting off Rumsfeld's five-year-old plan to invade Iraq... They have grown wary of pleas for and justification of war on humanitarian grounds by those whose humanitarian credentials are compromised by their military, economic and political support for the tyrant Hussein and who, after 20 years, have suddenly discovered the plight of the Iraqi people.
The bombing commenced on the night of March 19, 2003. There were spontaneous nationwide protests all through the day on March 20 as citizens blocked roads in major cities to express disgust at being ignored by their democratic representatives' remorseless march to war.
So far, and it looks permanent, not a single "Weapon of Mass Destruction" has been found. Every claim made about their existence was known to be false at the time of the invasion. The unfolding events have demonstrated a severe failure of governance and accountability to the people, and to the real world, of a scale not seen for decades.
A motion was put to the House which stated the following:
"That this House recalls the Prime Minister's assertion that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction capable of being used at 45 minutes' notice; further recalls the Government's contention that these weapons posed an imminent danger to the United Kingdom and its forces; notes that to date no such weapons have been found; and calls for an independent inquiry into the handling of the intelligence received, its assessment and the decisions made by ministers based upon it."
Jack Straw tabled the following amendment to the motion, which was adopted on account of the votes of the MPs marked in column 7:
Leave out from "House" to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof: "believes that the Intelligence and Security Committee established by Parliament is the appropriate body to carry out any inquiry into intelligence relating to Iraq; and notes in relation to Iraq's disarmament obligations the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483."
Mr. Michael Portillo (Kensington and Chelsea) asked:
When the Prime Minister submitted a draft of the foreword, including the 45-minute point within it, did any intelligence officers remonstrate with the Prime Minister, or any other Minister, to say that they did not believe it should stand in the foreword because it was based on only a single source? If the answer is no, we can all move on.
The Foreign secretary, Mr. Straw replied:
The answer is no, and we can all move on.
Mr. Robin Cook (Livingston) asked:
May I return for a moment to the question of the 45-minute readiness of weapons of mass destruction? For me, the central question is not whether there was one source or two, or whether it was in the first or the second draft. The central point, as we can plainly see now that we are in Iraq, is that that statement was wrong. Has the Foreign Secretary noticed that General Conway, commander of the US Marine Corps in Iraq, has said, after inspecting every ammunition dump and having failed to find a single chemical shell, that we simply were wrong. If the US Marine Corps can say we were wrong, why cannot we?
After one round of evading, Mr. Straw said:
I do not accept that, because we have not yet been able to find physical evidence of the possession of such weapons, those weapons therefore did not exist. That flies in the face of all the other evidence.
Clare Short, during her speech, said:
Three very senior figures in Whitehall said to me that the Prime Minister had agreed in the summer to the date of 15 February for military action, and that that was later extended to mid-March. At the time, the Prime Minister was telling us that he was committed to a second resolution, and I preferred at that time to believe the Prime Minister. From reflecting, reading and examining everything that was done, I now believe that the evidence is overwhelming that there was a date. That is why the Blix process was not allowed to be completed. We acted according to a date, not to deal with the fundamental problem.
A motion was put to the House which stated the following:
"That this House welcomes the Ninth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee on the Decision to go to war in Iraq, Session 2002-03, HC 813; but notes some reservations by Committee members that it not only had insufficient time but insufficient access to crucial documents to come to comprehensive and definitive conclusions on some of the issues; further notes the recent concerns raised over intelligence material; and calls on the Government to set up a judicial inquiry finally to establish the facts of the matter."
An amendment was made to the motion, carried by the votes of the members marked in column 8, which read:
Leave out from "House" to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof: "welcomes the Ninth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee on the Decision to go to War in Iraq, Session 2002-03, HC 813; notes that substantial oral and written evidence, by and on behalf of the Government, was provided to the Committee; believes that the Intelligence and Security Committee, established by Parliament by statute, is the appropriate body to consider the intelligence relating to Iraq; and notes that this Committee has already begun its inquiry."
Mr. Michael Ancram (Devizes), who tabled the original motion, said:
Decisions of life and death can and must be taken only on the best information available. The House has no direct access to such intelligence but only what it is told by Ministers. If ... confidence is lacking or has been breached, the House cannot be responsibly asked to take on such grave matters.
Donald Anderson (Swansea, East), said:
I am confident that the Government believed that there was a real threat of the Iraqi regime using weapons of mass destruction. What other reason could one give for the issuing of protective anti-chemical warfare uniforms to our troops? It would require a conspiratorial mind of great magnitude to imagine that our Government would have gone through the charade of equipping our forces in that way if they did not believe that the threat was real.
Richard Younger-Ross (Teignbridge) said:
The MOD gave Challenger 2 tanks sufficient chemicals for the detectors to run for only six hours. Does that reinforce the right hon. Gentleman's point? Were we selling our troops short, or were some people in the MOD not taking the threat seriously enough?
Sir John Stanley (Tonbridge and Malling) said:
Yesterday, and again today, the Foreign Secretary made what I considered an extraordinary statement, suggesting that the Government did not consider the intelligence assessment that was made before the war in Iraq to be central to the issue of whether we should go to war... For a great many of us who voted on 18 March, the intelligence assessments were not part of the background at all; they were absolutely part of the foreground -- part of the heart of the matter.
The summer recess began. Dr Kelly committed suicide, the Hutton Inquiry was established under the narrow terms that it investigate the circumstances surrounding his decision to kill himself.
So far there has been no official public investigation into the decision to slaughter thousands of people in a foreign land who posed no threat whatsoever to the nation.
But it's not necessary. The table of those British nationals, our democratic representatives in government, who could have brought this to a halt at any time by the simple act of collectively walking through a door which said "Noe", is listed below.
After the disastrous first summer of the US-UK occupation of Iraq (deemed a success by nobody in the world but the high-ranking officials of the occupying powers, and their employees) a motion was put to the House which stated the following:
"That this House welcomes the publication of the recent draft resolution of the United Nations Security Council on Iraq; calls upon Her Majesty's Government to honour the Prime Minister's commitment to give the United Nations a vital role in the political and economic reconstruction of Iraq through a new Security Council Resolution which would expedite the restoration of sovereignty and democratic control to the Iraqi people, place the process of political transition under the auspices of the United Nations, transfer the whole responsibility for the economic reconstruction and rebuilding of Iraq to an Iraqi provisional government assisted as necessary by the United Nations and replace existing security arrangements with a multinational force under unified command obliged to report to the Security Council."
As usual, rather than voting out the motion, the entire motion was changed by an amendment, carried by the votes of the MPs marked in column 9:
Leave out from "House" to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof: "supports the vital role played by the United Nations in Iraq as endorsed by UN Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1500 (2003); pays tribute to the Secretary General's Special Representative, Sergio Vieira de Mello and his colleagues brutally murdered in the terrorist atrocity of 19th August; welcomes the determination of the United Nations Secretary General to remain engaged in Iraq; further welcomes the initiation of discussions on a new UN Security Council Resolution on Iraq, which aims to reaffirm the United Nations' support for the work of the governing council, calls on the governing council to submit a timetable and programme for the drafting of a new constitution for Iraq and for the holding of democratic elections, proposes a United Nations-mandated multinational force under existing unified command arrangements and encourages UN Member States and international organisations to help the Iraqi people by providing resources for rehabilitation and reconstruction at next month's conference in Madrid."
The Secretary of State for Foreign Adventures, Jack Straw, lied:
If Iraq failed to meet the conditions, 1441 warned that "serious consequences" would follow. Diplomatic parlance is notoriously ambiguous, but that phrase was understood to have only one meaning -- military action... it was understood to be interchangeable with "necessary means" or "necessary measures".
Mr. Michael Ancram (Devizes) said:
In June this year the erstwhile Secretary of State for International Development admitted that "the preparations for post-conflict were poor and we have got the chaos and suffering that we have got now". Those are the words of the person who had been responsible for producing a plan, and that began to fill me with suspicion that a plan might not have been made.
Ann Clwyd (Cynon Valley) said:
I was last in Iraq in June... On Monday, I mentioned a general who is the brother of an Iraqi friend of mine who lives in Wales. The general told his brother that he could get between 50 and 100 senior officers to act as liaison between the coalition and the Iraqi people. He had sent a message to Ambassador Bremer, but had not received a reply.
Last night, coalition forces -- the Americans -- burst into the house of the very general whom I mentioned on Monday, and all his family and his house were searched. I found it a curious coincidence that I mentioned that man on Monday and that his house was attacked last night. He is not the only one.
Mr. David Heath (Somerton and Frome) said:
When the Foreign Secretary talks about his genuine efforts to find a consensus on the second resolution, he omits to say that he was seeking a consensus on the way to engage in military conflict rather than a consensus on how effectively to disarm and deal with Iraq with the agreement of other members of the Security Council.
Dr. Jenny Tonge (Richmond Park) said:
Today, the Prime Minister referred to a "magnificent" victory in Iraq. Yesterday, the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Hove (Mr. Caplin), was very upbeat about the situation. He certainly over-egged it... He told us that reconstruction was taking place all over Iraq and that hospitals were open -- never mind what is going on inside them. He said that children were going to school, and that electricity and water were on tap... Who was he kidding?
The UN negotiations continue in New York, in an attempt to transfer the blame and expense to the international community, while maintaining control of the land and its mineral wealth.
The Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, now maintains the self-contradictory position that the invasion of Iraq, against the will of the UN, was necessary to uphold the will of the UN.
The UN, flawed by design, is technically unable to censure the US and UK governments for wanton acts of international violence due to security council vetos held by the nations involved. This veto is far more important than the earlier supposed French veto against unconditional authority for an invasion without sound evidence of its necessity, because it means that, though the ongoing crimes of the US and UK are far more serious than the possession of chemical weapons by a defeated nation, the UN cannot indict them.
| Column | Date | Motion | Aye | vote | Noe | vote | (div no) |
| 1 | 24 Sep 2002 | To adjourn the Iraq and WMD debate | • | 6 | o | 70 | 319 |
| 2 | 25 Nov 2002 | To require a further debate before war starts | o | 84 | • | 452 | 6 |
| 3 | 26 Feb 2003 | To endorse the government's drive to war | • | 434 | o | 124 | 97 |
| 4 | 26 Feb 2003 | To add that the case for war is not proven | o | 199 | • | 393 | 96 |
| 5 | 18 Mar 2003 | To give the government the authority for war | • | 412 | o | 149 | 118 |
| 6 | 18 Mar 2003 | To state that the case for war has not been established | o | 217 | • | 396 | 117 |
| 7 | 4 Jun 2003 | To call for an inquiry into why no WMD has been found | o | 203 | • | 301 | 217 |
| 8 | 17 Jul 2003 | To note that the official inquiry into the war was unsatisfactory | o | 200 | • | 299 | 294 |
| 9 | 10 Sep 2003 | To call for the UN to be given a vital role | o | 53 | • | 285 | 307 |